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1 Introduction
It surely feels as if conspiracy theories and conspirational thought are at an
unprecedented high. A quick glance into the comment section of almost
any topic at almost any online news outlet will acquaint you with a wide
range of conspiracy theories, from the moderately suspicious to the outright
bizarre.
Indeed, it seems that almost any recent event is the result of a conspir-
acy. 9/11 was an inside job, Obama’s birth certificate is a forgery, global
warming is a major hoax. Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 has been abducted
by the Unites States, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 has been shot down by
a Ukrainian fighter jet in a failed attempt to assassinate Vladimir Putin.
Refugees are let in masses to enter the EU as part of a large conspiracy
that tries to abolish nation states and install the New World Order. The
Clintons are members of a child sex ring that operates from a Washington
D.C. pizza place. The Paris terror strikes of 2015 were in fact another inside
job, while the terror attack on a Christmas Market in Berlin last winter did
not actually kill anyone—with the exception of the alleged terrorist—, but
was just entirely staged by the German government.1
1All claims about the content of particular conspiracy theories in this essay can be
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For all we know, these theories are false. More importantly, some of
them are simply absurd. Can’t we then just shrug the rise of conspiracy the-
ories off as a an insignificant—and perhaps even somewhat entertaining—
cultural development that is largely due to the fact that—thanks to the
internet—nerdy crackpots have it now very easy when they want to dis-
seminate their crazy views?
Well, I don’t think that we can just shrug it off. On the one hand,
conspiracy theories, of the kind just listed, aren’t harmless. As I said, for
all we know, they are false. So, people who believe these theories believe
something false, and might—because of that—make poor choices. They
might end up voting for the wrong party, or oppose important policies,
they might not vaccinate their children, might not be willing to contribute
to efforts intended to prevent global warming, and so forth.
And these are still only the moderate negative consequences. On Decem-
ber 4 of last year, 28 year old Edgar Maddison Welch took his assault rifle
and a revolver and drove from Salisbury to the pizza restaurant “Comet
Pingpong" in Washington D.C. in order to investigate himself whether the
restaurant indeed houses a sex ring of child abusers (as it was claimed in
the “pizzagate” conspiracy theory). He did fire his gun there, fortunately
not hurting anyone, and, of course, found nothing. So one reason for being
worried about the rise of conspirational thought should be that it leads to
false beliefs.
False conspiracy theories are also harmful to those not believing them.
Scientists, officials and journalists will have to spend their valuable time
debunking false allegations. This debunking is enourmously complicated
by the fact that the false theory one is trying to debunk is a conspiracy
theory. All the evidence one can produce against the conspiracy theory is
just too easily interpreted in the light of that very theory as simply being
further smokescreen produced by the conspirators.
Finally, conspiracy theories are not only a symptom of a receding trust
in expertise, science, and the government, but the propagation of these
theories further nourishes this distrust. This development undermines
these institutions. In a society in which universities and experts aren’t
trusted anyway, few will protest when universities are closed and research
funding is cut.
verified via the relevant Wikipedia entries. These entries also contain links to websites
providing more information.
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So, these theories aren’t harmless. But also their support isn’t marginal,
it isn’t confined to “middle-aged white male Internet enthusiasts who live
in their mother’s basements” [Uscinski and Parent, 2014, 5]. As polls in
the United States show, “conspiracy theories permeate all parts of Amer-
ican society and cut across gender, age, race, income, political affiliation,
educational level, and occupational status” [Uscinski and Parent, 2014, 5].
The political relevance of this phenomenon is also apparent in Europe.
‘Lügenpresse’ (lying press) has become famous as the fighting word of
the self-proclaimed “critical citizens” that support PEGIDA or the AfD in
Germany. Essentially, the background of the “Lügenpresse” allegation is
just a conspiracy theory, according to which the left and liberal mainstream
media are collaborating with the German government in its evil plan to
destroy Germany with an influx of immigrants.
This all is surely reason enough to take the apparent rise of conspira-
tional thought seriously and to inquire into its origin. Many social scientists,
psychologists, historians, and a somewhat smaller group of philosophers
have thus looked into that issue in the past few years.
One of the central questions that will need to be answered here if we
hope to find out why conspirational thought is recently gaining such sup-
port and to find out how to respond to it, is the following: what mindset leads
to the belief in conspiracy theories? People who belief in conspiracy theories
are often ridiculed as nutcases, tinfoil hats, and paranoid crackpots, while
they portray themselves as particularly critical, better informed and en-
lightened responsible citizens. Finding out which of these characterizations
is correct is crucial for coming up with the appropriate response to the rise
of conspirational thought. Is the best response logic and argumentation or
is it therapy and medication?
In this talk I want to discuss this question and the phenomenon of
conspirational thought in two respects. First I want to explain how phi-
losophy, and epistemology in particular is essential for understanding the
phenomenon and for developing a strategy to deal with the harmful kind
of conspirational thought. Secondly, I want to show how epistemology
in turn can learn from studying this phenomenon. Along the way, I hope
it becomes clear that I see the analysis of conspiracy theories, its current
popularity and its cure a matter that requires interdisciplinary effort.
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2 What Can Philosophy Contribute?
So let’s begin with the question how philosophy can contribute. That
philosophy can contribute might not be obvious. Sociology and psychology
might prima facie be seen as the most relevant disciplines to explain the
phenomenon of the rise of conspirational thought and the questions of
whether its proponents are nutcases or sane critical citizens.
2.1 The Sociology of Conspiracy Theories
Let us consider sociology first. Conspiracies themselves are a social phe-
nomenon. Under which conditions they can form, be sustainable and
successful is an issue that social scientists are best placed to investigate. It is
also a matter of sociology to inquire who (i.e. what type) develops theories
about conspiracies and how these theories get disseminated to wider audi-
ences and come to be influential for public discourse. The latter is the social
study of—what might be called—“conspiracy culture” [Aupers, 2012].
Some sociologists believe that the study of such cultures should abstain
from any normative judgments about the rationality or accuracy of the
beliefs that are held and sustained in these cultures. In the literature on
conspiracy theories I found this view motivated from either Max Weber’s
considerations for a value-free science, or by David Bloor’s conception of
the so-called strong programme (e.g., [Harambam, 2017] cites both motiva-
tions as a motivation to refrain from any normative judgments).
Max Weber famously argued that social scientists should clearly distin-
guish practical value judgments from the rest of their empirical analysis,
because the former do not logically follow from the latter.
The strong programme, on the other hand, is a research paradigm in
the sociology of knowledge. According to that programme, historical or
sociological accounts of the choices made by scientists in the past should
receive equal treatment, whether the scientists were—from the point of
view of contemporary science—on the right track or not. Both views
are in a certain interpretation sound methodological advise and neither
results–under that interpretation—in normative impotence nor in radical
relativism.
But is does seem true that a purely descriptive sociological analysis of
the phenomenon of conspirational thought will not suffice to get a grip
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on conspiracy theories. If we think that the rise of conspirational thought
is problematic, we will need to understand what exactly is wrong with
conspiracy theories. Otherwise we won’t know how to adequately react to
the rise of conspirational thought and the effects it has on political discourse
and society in general. A descriptive, purely sociological analysis alone
will just not tell us that.
As I said, some sociologists will deliberately refrain from taking a stance
on the correctness of conspirational thought. But also sociologists who do
not shy away from taking such stance are not terribly helpful in identify-
ing what if anything is wrong with conspiracy theories. Joseph Uscinski
and Joseph Parent, for example, who published their study American Con-
spiracy Theories in 2014, in fact try to identify standards by which one is
supposed to measure how likely it is that a given conspiracy theory is true
[Uscinski and Parent, 2014].
We don’t have the time now to go into the details of each of these, so
one example must suffice to understand the problem with their approach.
Let’s just consider their first criterion, which they call “Occam’s Razor”.
According to that criterion, an explanation “is more likely to be false, the
more complicated it is” (and intuitively, many conspiracy theories are quite
complicated). Uscinksi and Parent do not tell us where that criterion comes
from or why it should be true, but let’s leave that aside for a minute.
However, Uscinski and Parent also claim that whether an explanation
is simple or complicated is subjective, and they admit that this will make it
difficult to apply the criterion. But that is, of course, not the only problem
with the supposed subjectivity of parsimony judgments. Unless Uscinski
and Parent are prepared to claim that it is also subjective how likely it is
that a theory is false, their first criterion is not just difficult to apply, but
plainly useless.
And the problems don’t stop there. For even if parsimony wasn’t a
subjective matter, theories can be simpler or more complicated in a variety
of ways. In what sense exactly is a conspiracy theory complicated? And
how could this be measured absolutely? At best a conspiracy theory can
be more complicated than some alternative explanation. But are they?
A conspiracy theory often purports to explain a wide range of things.
Many events that are unconnected according to the official story are in fact
orchestrated by the same conspirators that try to establish, say, the New
World Order—isn’t that a simpler explanation than one that explains these
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events from distinct unconnected causes?
The same questions arise with all the criteria that Uscinski and Parent
formulate. It’s not clear how they should be applied, they are not terri-
bly plausible, and no justification is given for why they should be good
indicators of the truth of a theory.
To cut a long story short, the social sciences can tell us a good deal about
certain descriptive matters. Like, for example, under what conditions con-
spiracy theories are likely to spread, and what type of people typically ends
up believing these. The great value of the analysis by Uscinski and Parent
lies in the observation that conspirational thought in the US, although also
there it seems to many to be on the rise, is actually over the past decades in
decline.
They also found, as already reported above, that belief in conspiracies is
not confined to specific demographics in the US. Moreover, they found that
the public impact of a conspiracy theory very much depends on who’s in
the White House. Under democratic presidents, more people believe that
communists are the conspirators, under republican presidents more people
believe that it’s capitalists who conspire against the American public. Of
course, in 2014 Uscinski and Parent couldn’t foresee that in 2017 a president
would be in the White House who himself propagates conspiracy theories.
Another sociological find, that seems to be quite robust, is the fact
that conspiracy theories often lead to more conspiracy theories. That is,
if someone starts to believe that 9/11 was an inside job, such person will
often also believe in other conspiracies, such as the idea that vaccinations
cause autism, or that climate change is a hoax or that the holocaust didn’t
happen. Moreover, it seems that there doesn’t need to be any coherence
between these theories, other than that they explain events in terms of a
conspiracy [Sutton and Douglas, 2014].
As we will see in a bit, such observations are crucial in order to under-
stand the rise of conspirational thought in a society, but by itself they don’t
answer the question to what degree (if any) conspiracy theories are ratio-
nally believed. For that latter question, the social sciences do not provide
the necessary expertise.
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2.2 The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
One might perhaps think that psychology is better equipped to deal with
that latter problem. Psychology informs us about our unconscious biases
and the quick and dirty heuristic that our mind uses to generate solutions
to problems that would sometimes better be tackled by careful reflection.
Psychology also informs us about character traits and personality profiles,
all of which can then be correlated with certain types of beliefs. For example,
a prominent explanation for why some people might be prone to believe in
conspiracy theories is that they have a hypersensitive module for agency
detection.
Hypersensitive agency detection is considered a cognitive bias that
came about as an adaptation.
[S]ince humans have evolved in an environment that contains
many agents (e.g., friends, enemies and dangerous predatory
animals) hypersensitivity to agency may be adaptive because it
makes people wary in their interactions with the environment
around them, reducing vulnerability to unexpected outcomes
and avoiding risk from potentially dangerous factors. Being
able to detect and understand an event and react quickly, or
respond quickly to an ambiguous situation, is important for
physical and social survival. [Douglas et al., 2016, 60]
While taking a stroll through the park, you hear a noise in a nearby bush
or tree, and you spontaneously form the belief that someone or some animal
is hiding there, while perhaps the sound just came from the wind stirring
up some leafs. Hypersensitive agency detection means that you sometimes
suspect agency when in fact there is none. Having a reaction of that kind
might still have been overall better for survival even if it sometimes leads
to mistaken assumptions of agents in your environment. As so often, it’s
better to be save than sorry. The fact that we have this hypersensitivity to
agency has been cited to explain why humans believe in the existence of
invisible spirits and gods, why we are superstitious and belief in causal
connections among unconnected events, etc.
Obviously, to overascribe agency and intentionality and to see purposes
and causal connections where there are none is typical for false conspiracy
theories. Thus, plausibly, people that tend to overascribe agency might also
be prone to believe in conspiracies. As Douglas and colleagues have shown
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in their [Douglas et al., 2016] this is indeed the case. They found that a low
level of education predicts endorsement of conspiracy theories, which is
mediated by a general tendency to overattribute intentional agency. Thus,
some people end up believing in conspiracies because of a certain thinking
style that involves hypersensitivity to agency.
Again, this is a very valuable and interesting result, but whether this is
going to help in understanding how we should respond to the apparent rise
in conspirational thought is still a question that is itself left open by these
psychological results. Is it sometimes rational to believe in a conspiracy
theory? If it is not rational to believe in such theory then the existence
of a hypersensitive module for agency detection could explain why some
people nevertheless believe in such theories. But the psychological result
is silent on that question. We learn that low educational level predicts
belief in conspiracies. But whether you believe a theory rationally is often a
matter of your background knowledge, a matter of the evidence that you
have for the theory and the alternative explanations that you are aware of.
Perhaps people who lack certain levels of education lack the background
knowledge that would make their belief irrational. In order to understand
better whether it is at all possible to believe rationally in a conspiracy theory,
we should eventually turn to philosophy.
2.3 The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories
Theoretical philosophy deals in several areas with the kind of normative
questions we are here seeking answers to. In logic we investigate the logical
correctness of reasoning and argumentation, in epistemology theoretical
philosophers investigate the conditions under which we can have knowl-
edge of the world around us, and in philosophy of science, we look at the
questions of when theories are supported by evidence, what criteria an
explanation needs to satisfy in order to be a good scientific explanation,
and how scientists should go about testing and revising their theoretical
accounts of the world. This is precisely the kind of expertise that seems
relevant for answering the question when—if ever—it might be rational to
believe a conspiracy theory. So let us see what theoretical philosophy has
to say about conspiracy theories.
The philosophical engagement with conspiracy theories is still rela-
tively young and—unfortunately—as yet not very developed. It is often
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(e.g. [Pigden, 1995]) claimed that Karl Popper was the first to write about
it in his famous opus magnum The Open Society and its Enemies in 1945
[Popper, 1962].
Popper’s theory is supposed to be that conspiracy theorists must believe
that every event is due to intentional successful planning and Popper holds
against this view that it overlooks the fact that many if not most of the
consequences of our actions are not in fact under our control. Very often
events happen as unintended consequences of our actions. Hence conspir-
acy theories are irrational, because they rest on an untenable assumption
concerning the amount by which we have control over the consequences
of our actions. If many or most of these consequences are not intended
then it can’t be true that all events are the product of successful intentional
planning.
People who understand Popper as making this argument have been
quick to point out that Popper’s critique of conspiracy theories can’t be
right. Why should every conspiracy theorist assume that all events are
the result of successful intentional planning? After all, conspiracy theories
are typically theories of specific outcomes, for example the collapse of
the World Trade Center, or the death of Lady Di. Why should conspiracy
theorists then have to believe that all events that happen were so planned?
And, clearly, sometimes events do come out as planned, so how is Popper’s
argument supposed to work?
I believe that this controversy is due to a misunderstanding of Popper’s
writings. Popper is not in fact engaging with conspiracy theories in the
way in which we are interested in them here. Popper is instead trying
to make a quite valid methodological point about the social sciences in
general. When he talks about the “conspiracy theory of society” he has
sociologists in mind who think that the social sciences work by providing
intentional explanations of social events.
A theory of the type Popper has in mind here, is—what he calls—Vulgar
Marxism, the idea that social events are to be explained by identifying the
social class related motives of the protagonists that brought an event about,
and to explain the event, in turn, as the intended satisfaction of these class-
related motives. But that’s not a theory or a criticism of conspiracy theories
as such.
So Popper didn’t believe that all conspiracy theories rest on that one
mistaken premise that all conspiracy theorists must believe that all events
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Figure 1: “Chemtrails are not a conspiracy theory”
are due to a conspiracy. Nevertheless this is a type of view that one can
indeed find in the philosophical literature. There are several attempts to
show that belief in conspiracy theories rests on some fundamental mistake,
such that it is always or almost always irrational to believe such a theory,
just because it is a conspiracy theory.
This is certainly somewhat in line with the ordinary use of the word
‘conspiracy theory’. To call a theory a “conspiracy theory”, or someone a
“conspiracy theorist” is often intended in a derogatory way. Wondering
whether conspiracy theories are irrational—in that usage—makes no sense;
of course they are. This usage is so widely spread that conspiracy theorists
themselves want to avoid the label. For example, you find youtube videos
on one of the paradigmatic conspiracy theories, the chemtrails theory, that
are titled “Chemtrails are not a conspiracy theory” (c.f. figure 1).
If that’s so, then perhaps we should define ‘conspiracy theory’ right
away as a certain type of irrational belief. So, perhaps a conspiracy theory is an
irrationally believed theory that explains an event as the result of a conspiracy. The
problem with such definition is that it doesn’t relate to the psychological
and sociological research on conspiracy theories. Most of that research
tries to correlate belief in certain specific explanations—for example the
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theory that 9/11 was an inside job, or that Oswald didn’t act alone—with
a demographic or psychological profile. But this correlation will hold
between this profile and conspiracy theories as defined in the proposed
definition only if these theories are irrationally believed by the people that
participate in that study. But these studies typically do not investigate on
what evidence or with which justification these theories are believed (as
we have seen above in the discussion of whether a hypersensitive agency
detection module can explain belief in conspiracy theories) .
The trick to close this gap is not to define conspiracy theory outright
as an irrationally believed explanation of some event, but to show that
conspiracy theories can only be believed in an irrational way.
It seems that what we’d need in order to draw immediate consequences
from the empirical results of psychology and sociology is a critical analy-
sis of conspiracy theories that resembles in result David Hume’s critical
analysis of miracles. In section X of his Enquiry David Hume makes the
following argument:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm
and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire
as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
[Hume, 1999]
Hume defines a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature. Thus to
recognize something as a miracle is to recognize it as a violation of the laws
of nature. But that means that we must have had strong empirical evidence
to believe the law in the first place, which the miracle supposedly violates.
Which means in turn, so Hume’s reasoning, that whatever evidence we
think we have for the proposed miraculous event is simply outweighed
by the evidence that speaks against it—it is far more likely that we are
not dealing with a miracle but with a mistaken or misleading observation
report. Consequently, believing that a miracle has occurred is always
irrational. This analysis rests on a conceptual and an empirical component.
The conceptual component is the definition of a miracle as a violation of
the laws of nature. The empirical component of the argument is human
fallibility, and the fact that miracles are never observed by sufficiently many
in order to outweigh the evidence against them.
11
Hume’s argument is controversial, but my point is independent of
whether Hume is right about miracles. I just want to explain by that analogy
that if we had such an analysis for conspiracy theories as Hume offers for
miracles, we could immediately answer our initial question: conspiracy
theorists must be paranoid nutcases, because there is no rational way to
believe such a theory (just as—according to Hume—there is no rational
way to believe in miracles). Also sociological and psychological research
into the correlation between, say, cognitive biases and conspiracy belief,
would then directly tell us something about the causes of these beliefs.
Alas, I don’t quite see how such a Humean analysis could be achieved,
at least not on conceptual considerations alone. Such “conceptual consider-
ations” of course depend on the definition one presupposes for the term
‘conspiracy theory’. We have seen above that such a definition should—at
least for our purposes—not include explicitly that any believe in such theory
is irrational.
But what is a conspiracy theory then? First of all, it is an explanation
for sometimes an event, sometimes just some other kind of phenomenon.
For example, the inside job conspiracy theory of 9/11 explains as an event
the collapse of the World Trade Center, and the theory that Diana, Princess
of Wales, was killed by MI6 explains as an event the car crash in a tunnel
in Paris in August 1997. As in these cases, the events in question are
often tragic or even traumatic, and believing that they were the results of
malicious intentional planning might be a form of psychological coping
with the tragedy.
However, not every conspiracy theory explains a traumatic event. For
example the chemtrails conspiracy theory holds that long-lasting trails, so-
called “chemtrails”, are left in the sky by high-flying aircraft and that they
consist of chemical or biological agents deliberately sprayed for purposes
undisclosed to the general public. So this theory explains the durability of
the condensation trails of planes.
In the introduction I already mentioned the pizzagate conspiracy theory.
This theory developed quickly after Wikileaks released emails that were
hacked from the account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hilary Clinton’s
campaign in the presidential elections of last year. The publication of these
emails occurred just a month before the election. The emails where then
discussed on social media and a few Trump supporting platforms. At
some point it was suggested that the occasional reference to pizza and
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to meetings at Washington restaurants were in fact secret code for child
pornography (allegedly, ‘cheese pizza’ with the initials ‘c’ and ‘p’ is code for
‘child pornography’). Under this new interpretation, seemingly innocent
and unconnected emails about dinner invites were quickly revealed to be in
fact hiding a child sex ring that the Clintons and the Podesta brothers were
a central part of, and that operated from the restaurant “Comet Pingpong”
in Washington D.C. In the case of the pizzagate conspiracy theory, there is
no specific event or even tangible phenomenon that gets explained. Instead,
the theory explains why John Podesta exchanged emails that contained
reference to pizza and dinners at restaurants.
So far we know that conspiracy theories are explanations of a certain
kind that explain something. What makes these explanations now conspir-
acy theories is that they invoke secretly conspiring agents as a salient cause
in the explanation. The reasons why these agents are conspiring secretly
can be several. Often it is assumed that the conspirators are not up for
anything good. They have malicious, evil plans, that would meet with
heavy resistance if the public were to learn about them.
But the maliciousness of the intentions behind the conspiracy are not a
necessary ingredient of conspiracy theories, even if one restricts the analysis
to the paradigmatic cases. First of all, some conspiracy theories remain
agnostic about the intentions that are behind the conspiracy. For example, a
prominent German authority on the chemtrails conspiracy theory expresses
in interviews that he does not know what exactly the chemtrails contain
and what they are good for, and that it is conceivable that they are supposed
to serve some beneficial purpose.
A clearer example is perhaps the theory that Paul McCartney died in a
car crash already in November 1966. According to that theory, Paul drove
off after an argument with the other band members during a recording
session, crashed his car and died. He was then replaced by a certain
“William Campbell” who had previously won a Paul McCartney lookalike
contest. William Campbell is in conspiracy circles referred to as “Faul
McCartney”.
The theory is extremely elaborate and there are hundreds of clues found
that are supposed to support it. At first, the theory is supposed to explain
why the Beatles for some time after Paul’s death did not appear in public
together. Since Faul McCartney is supposed to be taller than Paul, they also
didn’t play many live concerts anymore with the new line-up (so people
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Figure 2: The cover of Abbey Road, 1969
wouldn’t notice the difference in height between Paul and Faul). But the
band also left clues for their fans, since they couldn’t quite keep that secret
for themselves. Most prominently, the cover of the Beatle’s Abbey Road
record, which displays, according to the conspiracy theorists, a funeral
procession. Lennon in white is the priest, Starr symbolizes the undertaker,
Harrison, in denim is the gravedigger, and Faul, finally, out of step with
the others and barefooted is the supposed corpse (c.f. figure 2).
The theory is also confirmed by several backside messages that the
Beatles allegedly hid in their songs, and it explains the complex symbolism
of the cover of the Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967), which
supposedly represents the funeral of Paul McCartney.
According to most versions of that theory, the band, the management
and the media together conspired to hide the death of Paul McCartney
from the public. But the intentions behind it were not primarily sinister.
Most theorists seem to hold that the death of McCartney was covered up to
spare the public from grief. The Beatles were so popular at the time that it
would have been a catastrophe for the fans to learn that their idol had died.
Also, according to the conspiracy theory, the cover-up had an altogether
positive side effect; Faul is supposedly more talented than Paul McCartney
and the music of the Beatles improved after Paul’s death.
Thus, sinister motives are often assumed to be the reason for the agents
acting in secrecy, but it isn’t a defining feature of a conspiracy theory.
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Some definitions of conspiracy theories have a problem with the secrecy
condition. It is clear that conspirators intend to act in secrecy. But can a
theory still be a conspiracy theory if the secret conspiracy has been leaked
by, for example, a whistleblower? Once something is out in the open such
that others are aware of it, it isn’t anymore a secret, but isn’t being secret a
defining feature of conspiracy theories?
Again, this seems to be a confusion. Otherwise everyone who sincerely
proposes a conspiracy theory would thereby undermine it. Conspiracy
theories couldn’t be rationally believed, because they—literally—couldn’t
be believed. Obviously, the secrecy requirement just means that the con-
spirators intend to act and coordinate secretly.
Another feature that has been suggested as a defining feature of conspir-
acy theories is the fact that they are often in conflict with the “official story”.
On that view, the official explanation of the collapse of 9/11, namely that it
is due to a conspiracy between members of the terror network Al-Kaida,
is not a conspiracy theory, while the theory that the collapse is due to a
conspiracy in the US government is a conspiracy theory.
There are two problems with this requirement that a conspiracy theory
always has to be in conflict with the official story. One is that what counts
as “the official story” is context dependent. Russian mass media came
up with several explanations of the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
that conflicted with the explanation that the Dutch Safety Board and the
Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team provided. According to the story that
was in Russia considered to be the official account, the Ukrainian army was
to blame, while the official story recognized in the Netherlands holds that
the plane was shot down by a missile that was fired from a rebel-controlled
area. Which of these theories is a conspiracy theory and which is not
doesn’t depend on whether you are in Russia or in the Netherlands.
Another, related problem is that a conspiracy theory doesn’t cease to
be such if its proponents come to power. On April 10 2010 an aircraft
of the Polish Air force with several Polish government officials on board
crashed near the city of Smolensk in Russia. For some time, the official story
according to Polish and Russian investigators was that the plane crashed
because of an unsafe landing approach in the bad weather conditions of
that day. Now, in 2015 the political party “Law and Justice” won the
Polish parliamentary elections; the leader of that party, Jaroslaw Kaczyn´ski
believes that the crash is due to an assassination—possibly orchestrated by
15
Russia—and the investigation of the crash has since been reopened. What
used to be a conspiracy theory in conflict with the official account is now a
story supported by officials.
Likewise, the fact that it is the current president of the United States,
Donald Trump, who publishes on Twitter that his predecessor, Barack
Obama ordered to wiretap his phones during the election campaign, doesn’t
make the wiretapping story any less of a conspiracy theory. So, again, being
in conflict with the official story is not a defining element for a conspiracy
theory.
But then we arrive at a rather thin definition of the term ‘conspiracy
theory’:
Definition. A conspiracy theory is an explanation that cites agents acting
together in secrecy as a salient cause.
This definition is thin, which means that it is also quite broad.2 The
official explanation that 9/11 was the result of a secret plot by Al-Kaida
terrorists is a conspiracy theory just as much as the theory that it was an
inside job. But since we left out sinister motives from the definition, also
your suspicion that your friends may be planning a surprise birthday party
for you, is a conspiracy theory.
But because the definition is that broad, we also know immediately that
conspiracy theories in this sense can be rationally believed. In fact all of us
believe several conspiracy theories. In other words, a general argument
that could show that conspiracy theories are always irrational to believe
and that would just fall out of a definition of “conspiracy theory” is not
forthcoming. The kind of argument that Hume produced against miracles
can not be produced against conspiracy theories.
3 What is wrong with conspiracy theories?
But that means that a lot more work needs to be done, both on the side
of philosophy and on the side of sociology and psychology to understand
what goes wrong with conspiracy theories when they go wrong.
Now, of course, often conspiracy theories will be bad explanations of
an event for familiar reasons. Familiar in the sense that philosophers of
2A similarly broad definition is defended in [Dentith, 2014].
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science have already identified such reasons. For example one explanation
of an event might be worse than an alternative explanation of that same
event if it can explain less aspects of the event, if it is less supported by
the empirical evidence gathered about the event, if it needs to postulate a
greater number of unlikely events, etc.
Also, theorists who fall for these inferior explanations might make fa-
miliar mistakes, they might have taken a too uncritical attitude towards
the available evidence, they were epistemically lazy in not reviewing al-
ternative explanations, and they might have been ignorant with respect to
certain parts of the available evidence.
Psychological research into a “conspiracy mindset”, as well as philo-
sophical research into epistemological virtues and vices, can then profile
typical conspiracy theory believers and characterize their typical mistakes.
My suspicion is, though, that these familiar pitfalls of bad reasoning
and bad epistemological practice will only partly explain the phenomenon
of the rise of conspirational thought, at least for Western Europe. And
I believe that this is also the area in which philosophy might gain new
insights from studying this phenomenon.
In societies in which most of the media is clearly partisan, and where
your main or only channels of information are one-sided and also unreliable,
you may be lazy and end up with a largely mistaken picture of the world
around you. The echo-chamber that will reinforce your mistaken beliefs is
set up for you, and when you don’t make an effort to break out of it, you
will remain having a world view that might be massively mistaken.
Fortunately the relatively open societies of Western Europe are not like
this. For the most part, the media are doing a pretty good job in providing
accurate and relatively balanced information, they are also relatively in-
dependent, and from the way they are organized and managed, not likely
to get under external influence that could force the media to distort the
information they are providing. In such a situation, being an epistemically
lazy citizen of such a society does not automatically lead to inaccurate
beliefs. You actually need to do something, you need to find alternative
information sources in order to become massively misinformed.
And, strangely enough, this is what happens. The conspiracy theories
that you find in the comments section of your favorite news-outlet have
others found in the internet on specially dedicated blogs and websites,
when looking exactly for this alternative account. The people writing these
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comments did not lazily believe what the mainstream media tell them, but
go the extra mile and look up “information” that we safely ignore. After
critically weighing the different accounts they then make up their own
mind, and—tragically—end up with spectacularly false beliefs.
It is true that thanks to social media, like facebook, people can now create
their own echo chambers in which they only receive the information that
supports their world-view and beliefs, but not all conspiracy theorists
confine their information intake to such echo chambers. Indeed, those who
post the weird comments under your favorite news outlet, must at least also
consult that source. The picture of the lazy, gullible, ignorant conspiracy
theorists (c.f. [Cassam, 2016]) seems inappropriate for many cases.
This corresponds to the image that conspiracy theorists have of them-
selves. They are sceptics, they look at the information they receive via
mainstream channels more critically than others and are enlighted and
better informed than the average citizen (c.f. [Harambam, 2017]). Indeed,
the strategies they use in choosing the theory to believe are often consistent
with recommended criteria for good explanations (which I already listed
above), choose the theory that can explain more aspects, choose a theory
that is supported by more evidence, choose a theory that doesn’t postulate
a great number of unlikely events.3 Of course, in the application of these
criteria, mistakes are made, mistakes that are due to the fact that laypersons
are often not in a good position to apply the appropriate criteria for theory
choice.
I believe philosophy and epistemology in particular can gain from a
better understanding of these mistakes, because it promises to lead to
a better understanding of the general epistemological principles which
philosophy tries to formulate.
Some of the mistakes are relatively easy to identify. Take for example
the standard cui bono heuristic that conspiracy theorists use in order to find
the conspiracy that caused the event they try to explain. Sometimes such
a heuristic makes sense. Finding the culprit of, say, a murder by asking
who would have had a motive, is a useful strategy if you know that the
event in question was murder; an intentional and planned killing. But
you can’t just use this heuristic randomly for any event that you want to
explain, since not every event is the result of successful intentional action.
3The observation that conspiracy theories often seem to satisfy criteria for theory choice
better than their competitors is also made in [Hepfer, 2015].
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Here Popper’s argument against the conspiracy theory of society, that we
encountered in the beginning of the talk becomes now relevant for ordinary
conspiracy theories. Using a cui bono heuristic without prior independent
evidence that an event was indeed caused by intentional action relies on
unreasonable assumption about the world and is thus irrational.
Other mistakes are not that easy to analyze. Conspiracy theorists often
misidentify the relevant experts. They mistrust the proper scientist, but put
trust in charlatans. But how should they have known who the proper ex-
pert is, given that they themselves don’t know the relevant subject matter?
What criteria can laymen use to determine whom they can trust? In social
epistemology this is discussed as the “Novice/2-Experts Problem”, a prob-
lem that will require a solution in terms of indirect indicators of relevant
expertise (c.f. [Goldman, 2001]). Indicators that will have to be provided
by trustworthy institutions, such as universities. But these institutions are
in the danger of losing public trust, and we need to understand why that is
and what we can do to stop and reverse this development.
Finally, conspiracy theorists seem to suffer from a certain overconfi-
dence in their own ability to inform themselves and arrive at a considered
judgment over issues for which they don’t possess the relevant expertise.
Again, it is difficult to blame them for this if epistemologists standardly rec-
ommend that the art of critical thinking requires the exercise of your own
informed, critical judgment. Apparently, there is something wrong with
the idea that we always should exercise our own best judgment. Sometimes
it seems just prudent to trust the experts and to defer to their epistemic
authority. When that’s so and whether such deference is compatible with
the enlightenment ideal of epistemic autonomy is an open question that
philosophers need to answer (c.f. [Zagzebski, 2013]).
I hope that I have shown that conspiracy theories provide a fruitful
test-case for philosophical theories and that philosophy is the relevant disci-
pline to provide the normative analysis of the rise of conspirational thought
in Western societies. How the normative analysis should then be trans-
lated into policies and strategies to address this dangerous phenomenon
is, however, a question that philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and
political scientists will have to solve together. I very much hope that some
of these question will be solved by us in Utrecht and I’m very much looking
forward to collaborating with many of you on these questions.
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